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Abstract
This artic le  a ttem pts to  a rticu la te  w hat philosopher- 
scientist Michael Polanyi m eant by a post-critical intel­
lectual ethos and to explore its implications for concrete 
academ ic practice.
The m odern critical trad ition’s strategy for defea­
ting the dem on of self-doubt and for securing certainty, 
as H annah A rendt has w ritten, restricts serious candi­
dates for belief to those whose conditions o f tru th  can 
be rendered  wholly im m anent to focal consciousness 
within a point of view that is simply taken for granted. 
T hereby it forecloses the possibility o f recognizing the 
partiality o f its own perspective vis-á-vis tha t of others, 
taking into account the relevant perspectives of o ther 
persons, and reach ing  any kind o f sense in com m on 
betw een perspectives. The institu tionalization  of this 
s tra tegy  in 20th cen tu ry  academ ic life is am ply and 
insightfully docum ented in Bruce W ilshire’s Moral Col­
lapse o f  the University. M ichael Polanyi, in his writings, 
adum brates a post-critical in tellectual ethos in which 
the making of sense in common between persons of dif­
fe r in g  p e rsp e c tiv e  is c e n tra l to  th e  e n te rp r is e  o f 
teaching, learning, and research.
This arliclc was originally published in Tradition and Discovery 19/1, 5-15.
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1. IN TRO D U CTIO N
My rem arks h ere  grow out o f nearly  a q u a rte r  cen tury  o f w restling  w ith w hat 
Michael Polanyi referred to by the phrase, ‘towards a post-critical philosophy’, in the 
sub-title of his most im portant work. Personal Knowledge. Polanyi’s words imply that 
he was seeking to articulate a post-critical philosophy, and that implication I have no 
wish to  deny. H owever, it seem s clear tha t it was not just tow ard a post-critical 
philosophy that Polanyi was aiming. Just as much or even m ore so, I believe, Polan­
yi was seeking to articulate a  vision of a post-critical intellectual ethos, a context and 
style of intellectual life, a  ‘convivial order’, that would be free of the inordinate criti­
cal passions and objectivist epistemology that plague the m odern critical ethos and 
render it so problem atic and unconvivial.
I should make plain at the start that my interest here is less with what Polanyi 
has said and w ritten than with the enterprise with which I understand Polanyi was 
engaged and w ith which he solicited o thers’ engagem ent: namely, fostering the 
emergence of a post-critical intellectual ethos.
My shift of emphasis from ‘a post-critical philosophy’ to ‘a  post-critical intellec­
tual ethos’ is m eant to broaden the focus from the individual knower in the abstract 
to  the knower in community with o ther knowers, and from a specific philosophical 
viewpoint that may or may not be shared by other philosophers to Polanyi’s account 
of w hat it m eans to  indwell a given thoretical framework alongside o f others who 
may happen to indwell quite distinct theoretical frameworks. It strikes me that most 
scholarship on Polanyi has focused on the form er to the relative neglect of the lat­
ter, with the result that little of Polanyi’s work has been used to illum inate our own 
lives in the academy and the roles that each of us play in our larger intellectual cul­
ture. In other words, my concern is to identify some of the implications o f Polanyi’s 
thinking for our practice as intellectuals in the academy.
I shall proceed to do this, first, by relating Polanyi’s thinking to  what H annah 
A rendt has identified as ‘the loss of common sense’ in the m odern world. Second, I 
shall briefly draw upon one of the more impressive recent attem pts to diagnose the 
current malaise of higher education -  namely, Bruce W ilshire’s The Moral Collapse 
o f  the University (1990) -  to give the bones of this relatively abstract analysis some 
concrete flesh, particularly  as it relates to  our lives as m em bers o f the academy. 
Third, I shall briefly'explain the crux of the difference betw een our critical intellec­
tual ethos and a post-critical intellectual ethos. Finally, I shall a ttem pt to  identify 
som e of the features of the post-critical intellectual ethos that Polanyi envisioned 
which, if m ore widely recognized and appropriated, could play a crucial role in the 
recovery of common sense in the academy.
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I
Political philosopher H annah A rendt (1958;ch 39) has argued that the m odem  criti­
cal tradition is characterized (in part at least) by a C artesian strategy it uses to con­
quer the dem on of sceptical self-doubt: It restricts rational evidence to  w hat is or 
can be m ade im m anent to  consciousness (clearly and distinctly), and knowledge to 
w hat the m ind is ab le  rigorously to  in fer therefrom . T his is th e  source of the 
m odern m ind’s insistence upon explicitness; by insisting on keeping all o f its (focal) 
concerns explicit, it m aintains strict control (a t least it appears to m aintain control) 
over the m ind’s natural credulity, its tendency to  believe w hat cannot be proved, 
which is the source of its greatest fears. A  candidate for belief, whose truth condi­
tions cannot be m ade focally im m anent to consciousness, especially one originating 
from another, unfam iliar point of view (whose intim ations are inaccessible from the 
given po in t o f view ), is accordingly no t given a second  though t. (T his kind of 
response is virtually certain when the point of view taken for granted has the autho­
rity of established professional academ ic consensus and the po in t o f view within 
which the candidate for belief has been expressed does not yet have such a stan­
ding.) The curious result of all this, which A rendt points out, is that this C artesian 
strategy for securing certainty itself forecloses the possibility o f comm on sense.
W hat A rendt m eans by common sense needs som e explanation (A rendt 1958; 
chs 7, 39 & p 208f) First of all, she does not m ean w hat we ordinarily  take it to 
m ean: namely, a  collection o f opinions about the world and things in general that 
ordinary people find obvious and take for granted w ithout question. Nor does she 
m ean the som ew hat m ore soph istica ted  set o f com m on-sense beliefs th a t G  E 
M oore took to be foundational for all our understanding of the world (see M oore 
1959). Nor, as she m akes clear, does she mean by it the E nlightenm ent idea of a 
universal faculty of natural reason, possessed by each hum an being as such and by 
virtue of actualizing which one is supposed to transcend one’s anim al nature and 
realize one’s humanity.
In developing her conception, A rendt makes appeal to A ristotle’s definition of 
comm on sense as the faculty of mind whereby we integrate the deliverances o f our 
five separate senses into a unified perception (a common sensing) of single realities 
whose different sensory aspects are picked up by the respective senses (A rendt 1958; 
208f, 283). However, A rendt goes beyond Aristotle’s notion to identify by ‘common 
sense’ something quite distinct: She means by it a sense-ability that corresponds not 
to a hum an being as such in the singular, but to  hum an beings in the plural: The 
capacity to make sense in common with o ther persons, the capacity to integrate into 
the recognition of a com m on or public reality betw een us the private experiences, 
imaginings and thoughts we respectively have of it as distinct individuals. Common
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sense is that by virtue of which we fit our private reasonings into a single world com­
mon to us all and by the aid of which we move about in it in relation to one another. 
By m eans of it we com e to realize how our perspectives differ from and relate to 
one another’s. But it can only do this because it is precisely what enables the expe­
rience of m utual recognition betw een two o r m ore independent persons: W here 1 
come to see that you see the same thing that I see and you come to see that I see the 
same thing that you see, each from our own distinct perspective. It corresponds not 
to  our ability through some universal form of reasoning each to come up with the 
sam e answers (as when we each add 2 + 2 and all come out with 4) (A rendt 1958; 
283). It corresponds rather to our ability jointly to recognize that we each are  gathe­
red around the same thing between us, each considering it independently from a dif­
ferent angle. It is the ability to recognize something-in-common, not despite our diffe­
rent viewpoints but by virtue o f  those very differences. It is the ability to  catch on to 
how the sam e thing can be seen in such different ways. H ence it is much m ore a 
m atter of ‘catching on to’ what others are getting at from where they stand than it is 
a m atter of following up and confirming their explicit reasonings. (N ote that only 
the latter is accredited by the m odern critical tradition.)
A rendt’s conception of comm on sense thus names the foundational recognition, 
regardless of w hatever point o f view or fram e of reference we may assume, that we 
are all embodied knowers alongside one another, concerned with discovery o f  truths that 
transcend our respective subjectivities -  truths that we recognize do transcend our sub­
jectivities in the measure that they are capable o f  eliciting m utual recognition between 
us. We have reason to believe that we do transcend our subjectivities in coming to 
know the external world precisely as we achieve (and continue to achieve) sense in 
comm on with o ther independent knowers. (Polanyi’s [1958:252f, 300ff] differentia­
tion of the personal from the subjective marks this very transcendence, although it 
may not sufficiently highlight the respect in which such transcendence entails the 
possibility of mutual recognition with other independent knowers.)
H ow ever, as a lready m entioned, the m odern  critical trad itio n ’s strategy for 
defeating the dem on of self-doubt and securing certainty -  namely, the strategy of 
restricting serious candidates for belief to those whose conditions of tru th  can be 
rendered wholly im manent to focal consciousness (a consciousness whose distinctive 
point of view is simply taken for granted, though it attem pts to  escape ‘subjective’ 
ta in t by universalizing its form  [Cannon 1981:157ff]) -  this strategy closes off the 
very possibility of common sense between persons, who necessarily embody differing 
points of view. Indeed, by restricting consideration to what can be m ade im manent 
to its own focal awareness, the point of view in question avoids appearing, or being 
acknowledged, as one perspective among others. For itself it is disembodied. For
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itself it is not in the world alongside of others. For itself rational inference is restric­
ted to linear moves within its own frame of reference; no dialectical shift lo another 
perspective can be countenanced as rational. (I suspect that, largely as a result of 
this restriction, the pre-m odern study of dialectics has been eclipsed from considera­
tion in m odern logic as a m atter of rational inference.) Indeed, for itself, there is al­
lowed to be no other, no cognition of anything transcending itself. Consequently, for 
itself there are no conceivable, legitimate points of access to the m atters with which 
it is concerned other than its own. Hence there is no need to explore any such alle­
ged points o f view and no purpose for em pathy as a source o f cognitive insight. 
(O ne is hard put to make sense of how empathy is even possible on its terms.) For 
itself, as A rendt m akes clear, there is strictly speaking no world in com m on at all 
(A rendt 1958:57f).
But w hat else could one expect, given the C artesian inheritance of scepticism 
which renders suspect the very possibility of knowing other minds as well as the pos­
sibility of knowing an external world? Notice that the doubtfulness o f each of these 
possibilities follows directly from the implicit Cartesian refusal to  entertain  as m ea­
ningful any point of view but its own. (W ithin a strict Cartesian frame of reference, 
the very idea of d ifferent points of view becom es m eaningless.) Thus, by its very 
nature, the C artesian strategy entails the loss of common sense.
It should be clear by now to readers who are  at all fam iliar with the work of 
Polanyi that his work definitely addresses the range of issues posed by A rendt’s ana­
lysis as I have presented it. (Those readers who already know A rendt’s analysis may 
recognize my im plicit deb t to  Polanyi in unpacking w hat A rend t is getting at.) 
Polanyian them es directly relevant to A rendt’s analysis include; TTie tacit, personal, 
fiduciary com ponent and the from-to stretch of embodied tacit knowing that domici­
les us all in particular points of view; recognition of the personal coeficient of the 
knower in community with other independent knowers in all intellectual endeavour; 
all explicit knowledge being necessarily rooted and grounded in tacit knowledge (i e 
all explicit knowledge, despite its focal appearance as represen tative or proposi- 
tional knowledge of being domiciled in no point of view, is in actual fact rooted and 
grounded in a tacit knowledge by acquain tance th a t is incarnate  in a particu lar 
em bodied view point); our knowing of a com prehensive entity through indwelling 
and our knowing of o ther minds through indwelling, which, taken together, make 
possible a ‘m eeting of minds’ in convivial mutuality concerning the given com pre­
hensive entity; higher-order forms of knowledge being grounded essentially in a con­
vivial o rder whose accreditation  becom es the basis o f one’s self-accreditation  of 
com petence; reality as being inexhaustible to any one viewpoint, and as capable of 
revealing itself to an indefinite multiplicity of further viewpoints in unexpected ways;
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knowing as an adventure of following up intimations of hidden truth -  personal inti­
m ations of truth-in-com m on which call forth the services of the individual knower 
for revealing it and making it known-in-common; and the way in which our affirm a­
tions of our respective findings are always made with universal intent, appealing to  a 
m utual, confirm ing recognition from  future independent inquirers into the same 
m atters. In view of these Polanyian themes, I urge you to consider Polanyi’s work as 
contributing to the effort to re-establish, and provide justification for, our means of 
making common sense.
II
Bruce W ilshire’s recent book. The moral collapse o f  the University, traces how what 
A rendt refers to as the breakdown of common sense has become institutionalized in 
higher education  -  a breakdow n of comm on sense betw een one academ ic profes­
sional specialty and another, between faculty m em ber and student, betw een profes­
sional and lay person, and even betw een colleagues w ithin the sam e professional 
specialty -  all through the emergence and consolidation over the last century of aca­
demic professionalism. W hat Wilshire identifies is not new, I am sure, to any of us. 
His synoptic telling of the story in its moral pathos, so far as I am aware, is unm atch­
ed.
Bruce Wilshire is a professional philosopher, but his diagnosis of the malaise of 
the m odern university reflects more than a superficial accquaintance with the disci­
pline o f cu ltu ral anthropology. H is own work exem plifies the in terdiscip linary  
research that he advocates (W ilshire 1990;234ff).
W ilshire brings to  light, behind and obscured by the idealized, fo reground 
image of professional expertise and accomplishment in each professional academic 
field, an ‘archaic background’ in which operate powerful, pre-rational purification 
rituals (W ilshire 1990:ch VII). Through these rituals, recognition of the ‘purity’ or 
‘im purity’ (and degrees thereof) o f one’s professional perform ance by one’s col­
leagues in the professional discipline is bestowed. In this way a sense of one’s iden­
tity as a professional sociologist, say, is given shape and a professional conscience is 
inculcated and reinforced. The ‘pure’ are those which are judged to  hue close to the 
professional paradigm . The ‘im pure’ are those which fall short in one respect or 
ano ther. The rem arkable  thing is that all this goes on w ithout the partic ipan ts 
taking in rationally what is going on -  precisely because their conception of knowing 
is decisively inform ed by the C artesian paradigm  of so exclusively focusing on the 
explicit com ponents of knowing that the enveloping tacit background is entirely lost 
to reflective awareness. In W ilshire’s (1990:170) words:
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Com bined with the need to achieve professional com petence in order 
to  be som ething defin ite -  but typically hidden by this professional 
behavior -  are archaic identity needs. These tend to  go unrecognized.
W hen they threaten  to become them atic their shocking nature usually 
prom pts their repression -  self-deception occurs (‘Y our dogs are bar­
king in the cellars’, says N ietzsche). 'Die result is that the ability of 
professional com petence alone to form the self is overloaded, freigh­
ted with hidden baggage. The academ ic person all too easily pursues 
professional objectives compulsively -  frantically, num bly fearfully.
H e o r she is in no position to see the ‘irrational’ side o f the pursuit - 
particularly that the need for recognition from the professional peer 
group is so immense that the group acquires the num inous authority 
of a tribe. O ne’s identity is engulfed in the identity of the group; those 
who fall outside it are other, and their presence within it contam inates 
both it and its members. Students are other.
W ilshire points out how it is precisely by excluding rapport with these others that 
such professionalism  fails to make comm on sense and cuts itself off from the com­
mon world.
More specifically, W ilshire discusses the professionalization of the discipline of 
philosophy (ch 5) and how some purification rituals work within the American Phi­
losophical Association meetings:
Some acu te  observers, such as R ichard Rorty and Janice M oulton, 
have poin ted  out recently that the actual form of exchange betw een 
philosophy professors at these m eetings fits no historical m odel of 
legitim ate philosophical dialectic, but is ra ther m odeled on the con­
frontation  of lawyers in a courtroom . In the half century 1930-1980, 
they claim, philosophers have attacked each o th er’s positions in the 
m an n er o f law yers a ttack in g  each  o th e r ’s b rie fs: th e  ‘adversary  
m ethod in philosophy’, as Moulton puts it. An instant verdict is ren­
dered thereby, and the contestant moves in one way or another in the 
shifting, breath-taking rankings of ‘professionals in the field’. But the 
self is no t just the professional ego, and it rem ains bu rdened  with 
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Although he does not say so in so many words, it does not take much to recognize 
that such contexts are hardly places in which mutual recognition betw een persons of 
significantly different viewpoints is likely to take place.
All this might not be so bad if the consequences of these purification rituals 
w ere not so m orally problem atic. For w hat they largely take for granted and en ­
force -  without participants really realizing it reflectively -  is a  scientismist, techno­
cratic, and bureaucratic conception of the university as a knowledge factory (Wil- 
shire 1990:ch III), in which each disciplinary specialty is supposed to  tend to its own 
business of producing, by means of its professional expertise, its pre-assigned bit of 
useful knowledge for manipulating the world -  in blithe indifference to what is going 
on in any o ther specialty and in the world outside the academy.
I am  not saying tha t D escartes’ philosophical thought crea ted  the 
m odern world. But in an uncanny way it reflects and focuses what was 
at work, and what was to be at work, in the culture at large. It also 
anticipates the contem porary research university and its m aster p ro ­
blem: despite its vast research capacities and its knowldege, it exists in 
strange detachm ent from crucial human realities, and perpetuates the 
implicit dogma that there is no truth about the human condition as a 
whole (e.g. the humanities merely express communal or personal sen­
tim ent, hardly knowledge). The university fails to understand what it 
is doing and what it is abetting, because in the dom inant conception of 
know ledge, tru th  ab o u t e th ica l re la tio n s to  o thers  is b locked  or 
obscured, as is also our involvement in the moody background world - 
matters crucial to who we are and to what education should be.
(W ilshire 1990:40)
Professional recognition (or accreditation of one’s ‘purity’) is accordingly not given 
(or, at most, rarely given) for efforts or accom plishments which focus on questions 
o f this nature that lie outside the paradigm  of one’s disciplinary specialty -  such as 
in in terdisciplinary study, teaching, or research, in developing com prehensive or 
integrative understandings that span several disciplines, or in teaching (especially 
not in the research university). The extraordinary people who do devote significant 
energies and tim e to these ‘im pure’ enterprises accordingly go unrew arded; often 
they are censored. "Yet it is precisely such activities that have always constituted the 
moral core o f liberal learning in the university. H ence the title of W ilshire’s book: 
The moral collapse o f  the university.
The difficulties Polanyi faced with his work in philosophy outside of physical 
chemistry are illustrative of what Wilshire speaks of as a professional scholar’s work
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being stigmatized as ‘im pure’. And 1 suspect each of us may have stories to  tell that 
illustrate W ilshire’s point ad nauseam.
In the light of my earlier discussion o f A rendt’s account of the loss o f common 
sense in the m odern intellectual ethos, the purification rituals described by Wilshire 
are perhaps the chief means of im plem enting what A rendt identifies as the C arte­
sian strategy for defeating the dem on o f self-doubt. They are the practical means 
w hereby in te llectual inquiry w ithin a disciplinary specialty is res tric ted  to  w hat 
am ounts to a single perspective -  which is taken  for granted in an im personalized 
form as somehow guaranteeing objectivity. Accordingly, they are perhaps the prin­
cipal obstacle standing in the way of making com m on sense, of building up know­
ledge of a world in common, and of addressing with any effectiveness the large ques­
tions pertaining to the meaning and purpose of our lives.
W ilshire’s book is very rich, full of insights, pessimistic about any quick solution 
to these problems, and offers a few practical suggestions about what might be done 
in the short range (Wilshire 1990:chs XI and XII). It is certainly a  book with which 




I have repeatedly alluded to a contrast between the modern critical perspective and 
a post-critical perspective, the m odern  critical e thos and  a post-critical ethos. 
Although alm ost anyone who is appreciative of Polanyi’s work has a vague under­
standing of what is m eant by that contrast, few attem pts have been made to explain 
the contrast with sufficient clarity to give practical guidance for som eone wishing to 
have it m ake a d ifference in his o r her own in te llec tual work. I here  offer my 
attem pt to that end.
To have acquired a modern critical mind is to have been habituated, on the one 
hand, to distrust one’s first and natural inclination to indwell the world with believe 
and, on the o ther hand, to enrust oneself to the attitude of critical suspicion as the 
cardinal intellectual virtue. This is because modernity is prem ised on the assump­
tion that the root of all error is the inherent hum an proclivity to  project into reality 
w hat is not there but only in oneself, in one’s credulity and subjective bias. O ur 
modern intellectual conscience insists that we will get at the truth of the m atters that 
concern us only by divesting ourselves o f subjectivity, by stepping outside o f our 
merely personal, mind bodily perspectives on to  them  and following im personal, 
‘objective’ procedures. In consequence, on reflection at least, we m oderns have dif­
ficulty believing in our own beliefs and trusting, without defensiveness, in any inward
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summons to  venture beyond the safety of impersonally established truths -  unless it 
be critically to disestablish or deconstruct som eone else’s alleged truths. (This is not 
to say that such critical efforts do not have their rightful place. It is only to say that 
such efforts becom e the only encouraged --indeed, the only ‘safe’ -  creative work 
within the m odern critical perspective.) O ur m odem  minds largely disable us from 
venturing to  construct or establish anything at all. If our own critical intellectual 
conscience fails to  keep our subjectivity in check, we can be sure tha t our profes­
sional co lleagues’ critical facu lties will be m ore than  ad eq u a te  for the job . (It 
should be clear from this that so-called ‘post-m odern’ perspectives that define them ­
selves as deconstructive of any and all m odem  claims to have overcom e subjectivity 
and arrived at objective tm th  are merely a  continuation of the m odern critical tradi­
tion.)
O n the contrary, a  post-critical perspective is one that, having passed through 
the baptism  of fire constituted by the m odern criticism o f subjectivity, nevertheless 
reta ins (o r regains) confidence in one’s own personal, m ind bodily perspective -  
reta ins confidence in it not as tru th  itself (which would m ake it indistinguishable 
from an ideological com m itm ent per se) but as one’s own best avenue, or clue, or 
stage-on-the-way to discovery of, truth-in-com mon. To occupy a  post-critical pers­
pective is to recognize that there is no other recourse. It is there, in the very particu­
lar incarnate rootage of our mind bodily being in the world, with its very particular 
past, however seemingly narrow, deprived, and parochial it may appear to a deraci­
nated critical perspective -  it is there, in being fully oneself, that the wellsprings of a 
sensibility and passion for an integrity of person in devotion to truth-in-com mon can 
be found.
A post-critical perspective thus re-appropriates the pre-m odern confidence in 
methodological belief -  a  chastened confidence to be sure -  to counter and comple­
m ent m odernity’s m ethodological doubt. (For further explanation, see Booth 1974 
and Elbow  1986.) W hereas m odernity’s maxim has been  ‘D oubt, unless there  is 
good reason to believe’, post-critical thought conjoins with it the pre-m odern maxim, 
‘Believe, unless there  is good reason to  doub t’. In m odern  critical thought one 
needs justification to believe, but no justification at all to doubt; indeed, for it one 
needs justification not to doubt. But in post-critical thought, one needs justification 
to doubt no less than one needs justification to believe. But such justification may 
not be publically discernable, at least not for the present. A  post-critical perspective 
recognizes that and respects each person’s ability to discern in advance intimations 
of that justification for herself/him self.
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IV
W hat features of a post-critical intellectual ethos as Polanyi envisioned it are parti­
cularly crucial to the recovery of common sense? As I see it, there are four key fea­
tures that are crucial, though they are not completely independent from each other. 
A lthough they are  here expressed in a theoretical way, they each have eminently 
practical implications. Note how each directly counters the m odem  critical strategy 
of restricting rational evidence to  what can be made im m anent to  a  single, taken- 
for-granted perspective (which rem ains a single perspective regardless o f how uni­
versal its form may appear to be) and restricting knowledge to  what can be strictly 
inferred therefrom  within the same perspective. The four features of a post-critical 
intellectual ethos that I shall highlight are;
• M utual recognition  betw een independen t knowers -  that is, com m on-sense- 
making -  is regarded as paradigmatic of the knowledge that is sought;
• Each person is regarded as having access to transcendent truth-in-com mon and 
the tacit know ledge-by-acquaintance through which they have that access is 
itself regarded as knowable in the experience o f mutual recognition of the truth 
in question;
• Persons o ther than any given knower are recognized as having transcendental 
status in relation to that person’s knowledge of transcendent truth-in-common; 
and
• There is m utual regard for and trust in each person’s capacity to participate for 
herself in discovering truth-in-com m on through following up her own intim a­
tions of that truth.
First, in a post-critical intellectual ethos, m utual recognition (common-sense-maidng) 
between independent knowers is regarded as paradigmatic o f  the knowledge that we 
seek. W hat does this mean? To begin with, it implies that any given knower’s pers­
pective is one perspective among others; yet that given know er’s perspective is, in 
principle, open and accessible to  any o ther perspectives on the sam e m atter. But, 
m ore im portantly, it m eans that knowledge is not conceived primarily as an indivi­
dual m atter that the knower can confirm on her own within a single, taken-for-gran- 
ted perspective (o r even as a co-operative endeavour w here know ers co-operate 
closely within a  single frame of reference as if they all shared a  single point o f view). 
Instead, it means always looking outside of and beyond current perspectives for con­
firmation of the objective reality of what is believed to be known (see Cannon 1981: 
164f). It m eans building bridges of com m unication with those who do not share 
o n e ’s perspec tive  to  enab le  a m eeting  of m inds -  th a t is, m utual recognition  
between persons in different specialties within the same discipline, between persons 
in different disciplines, between professional academ ics and students, and between
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professional academ ics and lay persons, and of course betw een perspectives of gen­
der and ethnicity as well. For this to  take place requires building synoptic or inte­
grative understand ings be tw een  these d iffe ren t fram es of reference , extending 
across whole disciplines and between disciplines; and it means no longer building up 
knowledge atom istically w ithin a given specialty w ithout regard  for its connection 
with anything else. The point is that our respective findings should serve to  build up 
and make known a world-in-common -  common not just to m em bers o f some disci­
plinary speciality, gender, o r ethnic group, which is no world-in-common at all, but 
com m on to  m em bers o f the w ider hum an com m unity. (Specifically, this would 
imply that one’s scholarly responsiblity should be understood to be at least as strong 
to  the rest of the academy and to the broader public as it is to one’s peers in the dis­
cipline.) To know entails a responsibility to make known. (For those of us in philo­
sophy, it obligates us to call into question at every turn the individualistic and isola­
ting Cartesian assumptions that continue to govern discussions of epistemology with­
in the m ainstream  of professional philosophy.)
Second, in a post-critical intellectual ethos, each person as such is regarded as 
having access, through tacit knowledge by acquaintance, to transcendent truth-in-com- 
mon, and each person’s knowledge itself is regarded as knowable by others in a m utual 
recognition o f  the truth in question. D espite the cultural weight o f three centuries 
behind the assumption, the mind is not a  closed container, herm etically sealed off 
from things in themselves, such that its knowledge of what lies beyond itself is neces­
sarily of a representative nature and which representative function is itself dubious. 
A post-critical in tellectual e thos grants each person his o r her own access -  by 
m eans o f m ind bodily know ledge by acquain tance -  to the being o f th a t which 
mutually concerns us. On the contrary, the modern critical intellectual ethos discre­
dits a priori the very possibility o f anyone’s d irec t acqua in tance  w ith w hat lies 
beyond his or her mind. As a result, any appeal to  tha t acquaintance, e.g. to  get 
ano ther person to  ‘see the po in t’ and ‘catch on to ’ som ething for herself, can get 
nowhere. But Polanyi’s tacit knowing by indwelling is a knowing by acquaintance, 
an acquain tance  with reality  th a t goes beyond im m ediate  (outw ard or surface) 
appearance: It lays claim to knowledge o f realities that transcend our im m ediate 
grasp. As Polanyi says, the mark of reality is its intim ation of inexhaustible future 
m anifestations. In transcending our own im m ediate grasp and our capacity for 
rep resen ta tion , such realities are accessible to points of view o ther than our own 
present viewpoint (o ther points of view simultaneous with an d /o r successive to our 
own presen t point o f view). The very idea of the transcendence o f reality in this 
sense is lost to  consciousness when knowledge is thought o f primarily, or only, as 
representative (propositional) knowledge, which is always limited to a single frame
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of reference. O n the contrary, a post-critical in tellectual ethos gives prim acy to 
knowledge by acquaintance as the root and ground of knowledge by representation. 
Such an em phasis grants access to, and a  basis for, recognizing reality-in-common. 
And only such an understanding will prom pt a  reader o r hearer to  seek to interpret 
explicit know ledge within its original living context of in tim ation -  in tim ation of 
aspects of reality transcending the specification in question. (M uch of current post­
m odernist interpretation and criticism seems to me to take its license from just this 
divorce o f explicit text from a living context of tacit intim ation.) T ruth, we want to 
say, is irreducible to, and inexhaustible for, any single perspective. Being so, it is 
transcendent in the sense just described: In its fullness o r com pleteness truth-in- 
common transcends each and every finite perspective. But it makes no sense to say 
this if it is not simultaneously accessible (in however limited a respect) to  each per­
spective and in a way that can be verified or confirmed in mutual recognition.
Third, in a post-critical intellectual ethos, persons other than any given knower 
are recognized as having transcendental status in relation to  that person’s knowledge 
of transcendent truth. This is to  say tha t they are necessary, in some sense a priori 
conditions for that know er’s laying claim to recognition o f transcendent truth-in- 
common. O ther persons are not merely sources of information that extend or supp­
lem ent my own perspective. As such they (or their own unique mindbodily perspec­
tives) cannot and must not be reduced to an extension of my own perspective. By 
‘transcendental status’ o f o ther persons I m ean to identify o ther persons as such as 
having access to -  and thereby affording me indirect access to  -  irreplaceable, inde­
pendent perspectives on the m atters that concern me, perspectives in appealing to 
which I m ake my claim  to transcenden t tru th-in-com m on w ith universal in tent. 
Hence, I need o ther knowers to be there and to be independent from me and 1 can­
not afford to close myself off from any person whose perspective is relevant to the 
m atters with which I am concerned. To the extent I close myself off to  anyone, I 
close myself off to the dim ension of transcendence in the m atters that concern me 
that is uniquely accessible to that person’s perspective. Obviously, the inverse holds 
true  as well. Thus, we need to  be in conversation with persons of different view­
points from ourselves. The meaningfulness of the transcendence of truth and reality 
beyond our subjectivity is grounded in our access to perspectives on that truth other 
than our own present perspective. O f course -  and here’s the rub -  for access to the 
o ther person’s perspective to become actual, an open receptivity toward the o ther 
and a truly em pathetic exploration of his or her perspective on the m atters in ques­
tion are necessary -  a receptivity and empathy which can, of course, be frustrated in 
so far as the o ther person is unco-operative or fails to develop and explore it him­
self. There are no sure strategies for overcoming these frustrations, although one of
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the better ones is to a ttem pt an em pathetic exploration of the o ther’s point of view 
on one’s own concerns despite his unco-operative attitude and soliciting his recog­
nition of the results of that exploration. Recognition of the transcendental status of 
o ther persons underscores and highlights that we are m utual occupants and explo­
rers o f a  w orld-in-com m on, quite apart from  the specific differences in our view­
points. Even more: It is what causes there to be a world-in-common for any one of 
us.
Fourth, in a post-critical intellectual ethos, there is m utual regard fo r  and tnist in 
each person’s capacity to participate fo r  herself in discovering truth-in-common through 
following up her own intimations o f  that truth, intimations that only she may be capable 
o f  following up. This feature of a post-critical intellectual ethos is particularly rele­
vant to the process o f education. To educate is in this sense necessarily to draw 
forth  understand ing  from  within the studen t in the context of her ongoing expe­
rience and developing acquaintance with the world. This notion of education makes 
little or no sense at all on the basis of the m odern critical assumptions that conceive 
of the mind as a closed container (with no direct access to reality beyond itself) and 
know ledge as prim arily  rep resen ta tive  (explicit, propositional). O n th a t model, 
education is principally thought to  consist of conveying explicit inform ation (both 
knowledge claims and their explicit justification). O n the contrary, in a post-critical 
intellectual ethos, not only must there be a trust in each student’s ability to come to 
discover further aspects o f truth-in-com m on along with the teacher (and o ther stu­
dents), but room must be granted for the student in the educational process to parti­
cipate m ore and m ore fully in doing just that, and plenty of opportunity  to  parti­
cipate in experiences of mutual recognition in which each student’s own mindbodily 
perspective makes a significant contribution. That, as Polanyi insists, we each know 
m ore than we can tell, behoves us to (a) give the other person the benefit of doubt 
when we fail yet to see what she may be getting at, and (b) m ake an em pathetic 
effort to ‘catch on’ to what she is trying to get at. To insist that the o ther person first 
make sense on our term s within our own fram e of reference (how ever im persona- 
lized they and it may be) in order to be taken seriously and her claims regarded as 
meaningful -  as the m odern critical intellectual ethos would have it -  is to deprive 
ourselves not only o f tha t person’s insights; it is to  close us off from reality in its 
transcendence.'
These four features o f a post-critical intellectual ethos would not be the only 
features o f such an ethos. Yet they are perhaps the most im portant o f its features 
relevant to  the recovery of com m on sense. A part from the em ergence of a  post- 
critical intellectual ethos, as Polanyi’s thought anticipates it, 1 see no likelihood of 
the recovery of comm on sense as A rendt conceives it. 1 hope I have aw akened in
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you enough of what that ethos amounts to for you to have a somewhat clearer sense 
of how to foster its growth in the context of your own work as teachers and scholars.
D Cannon
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